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Abstract 
The concept of Open Innovation (OI) has breathed new life into both empirical research 
and industry practice concerned with distributed and collaborative modes of 
innovating. Certainly, the volume of OI research and its impact on practice has been 
remarkable. However, equally remarkable is the lack of balance. With few exceptions, 
the stories of OI are positive stories. A unbalanced focus on successes leads to open 
innovation imperatives and the conclusion that, for most firms, openness is good, and 
more openness is better. In this paper, we nuance this perception by empirically 
investigating the relationships between innovation openness and its effects on project 
abandonment and delays. Using survey data from Belgium, we find that open 
innovation strongly associates with an increased risk of both project abandonment and 
project delays.  
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The conviction that “…interactive learning and collective entrepreneurship are fundamental 
to the process of innovation” (Lundvall 1992, p. 9) is longstanding. Yet, there can be little 
doubt that the concept of Open Innovation (OI) (Chesborough 2003) has breathed new life 
into both empirical research and industry practice concerned with distributed and 
collaborative modes of innovating. The frequency of journal special issues (e.g. Gassmann 
2006; Enkel et al. 2009; Carlsson and Corvello 2011; West et al. 2014; Tucci et al. 2016) and 
review articles (e.g. Dahlander and Gann 2010; Lichtenthaler 2011; West and Bogers 2014; 
Randhawa et al. 2016) is testament to the former. For the latter, recent commentary 
suggests that “…academic scholarship has been more than matched by the response of 
industry to the ideas of open innovation” (Tucci et al. 2016, p. 283; Du et al. 2014), manifest, 
for instance, in more attention to connections with external actors, the development of 
specialist departments and employees, and the evolution of specialised consulting services. 
Certainly, the volume of OI research and its impact on practice has been remarkable 
(Lopes and de Carvalho 2018). However, equally remarkable is the lack of balance. With few 
exceptions (e.g. Lhuillery and Pfister 2009; Hyll and Pippel 2015), our stories of OI are 
positive stories. The focus on successes leads to open innovation imperatives and the 
conclusion that, where ‘openness’ falls below some optimum, as is frequently the case, 
there is ‘market failure’1 (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2017). Despite suggestions of eventual 
diminishing returns (Laursen and Salter 2006; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2016), the 
                                                          
1 Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2017) “identify and examine three market failures which may help to explain this 
result [that engagement in OI falls below some optimum level]. These relate to a lack of understanding of the 
potential benefits of OI by firms, a lack of information about the capabilities of potential partners and a lack of 
information about the trustworthiness of potential partners”. 
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inference we are asked to draw is that, for most firms, openness is good and more openness 
is better. 
That there are so few studies of the relationship between openness and innovation 
failure is particularly surprising in light of persistent evidence on the high rates of failure in 
innovation projects generally (e.g. Link and Wright 2015). To the extent that innovation 
activity is inherently uncertain (Leoncini, 2016; García-Quevedo et al. 2018), both scholars 
and practitioners seem to recognise that innovation projects, and especially projects 
concerned with the development of more novel innovations, will fail “at an alarming rate” 
(D’Este et al., 2015, p. 280). Moreover, a parallel stream of literature has reflected upon the 
“dismal failure record” of strategic alliances (Gomes et al. 2016, p. 15). High coordination 
and monitoring costs, knowledge disclosure, and the risk of partner opportunism are typical 
in collaborative innovation (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2016). Coupled with asymmetries 
in expectations and commitment, and the difficulty in tightly specifying outputs in 
innovation contracts (Felin and Zenger 2014), the rate at which research partnerships lead 
to ‘failed’ outcomes is likely to be particularly high (Hagedoorn et al. 2000). 
Of course, innovation failure, generally, and the failures resulting from collaborative 
innovation, in particular, need not be negative. Indeed, failure and learning are tightly linked 
in innovation processes, given the role of trial-and-error discovery (Chesbrough 2010; 
Leoncini 2016). However, many of the resources committed to a specific innovation project 
are likely to be sunk and imperfectly transferable. Where there are additional search, 
negotiation, coordination and monitoring costs, the resources bound to an innovation 
project may be particularly high in the case of collaborative innovation. When failures 
constitute a larger component of innovation projects, the negative impact on firm 
performance may outweigh any positive learning effects. 
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This tension between failure as a learning opportunity and failure as a cost is 
apparent in the few studies that look at the relationship between openness and failure 
(Lhuillery and Pfister 2009; Hyll and Pippel 2015; Leoncini 2016; D’Este et al. 2015; Guzzini 
and Iacobucci 2017; García-Quevedo et al. 2018). However, these studies are invariably 
limited by a binary measure of failure: firms either fail or not. Or, more precisely, firms 
either record abandoning at least one innovation project or not. Consistent with evidence 
that the most innovative active firms are those that perceive the greatest barriers to 
innovation (e.g. D’Este et al. 2012), it also seems likely that collaborative innovators will be 
more likely to report an abandonment simply as a result of being more innovation active. In 
the current study, we are able to exploit data from the Flemish Innovation Survey that 
records the number of abandoned projects, and to scale these relative to the total number 
of innovation projects that firms engage in. In most firms, innovation is undertaken in a 
multi-project environment (Radas and Bozic 2012). An inability to account for project 
numbers (failed, successful and ongoing) is a significant limitation in understanding the link 
between openness and failure. It remains that we know relatively little about the failure of 
open innovation (West and Bogers 2014). Yet, a better understanding of the incidence of 
failure is likely to be critical to identifying the limitations of collaborative innovation and to 
understanding why collaboration is rarely observed to be the modal form of innovating 
(Drechsler and Natter 2012). The current work makes a contribution to this better 
understanding. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the conceptual 
background of our study and concludes with our hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
presents the data sources, variables and descriptive statistics, and section 4 discusses the 
econometric study and its results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Conceptual background 
2.1 Coupled-open innovation and abandonment 
Chesbrough's (2003) initial work identified two OI processes that entailed, separately, the 
leveraging of external expertise for the development and commercialisation of innovations 
internally, and the external commercialisation of internally developed innovations. 
Respectively, these are inbound and outbound modes of open innovation. However, a third 
mode, encompassing varying degrees of both outbound and inbound flows of knowledge 
and resources in reciprocal relationships between focal firms and other organisations, is 
perhaps most prominent in the empirical literature (West and Bogers 2017). This is Enkel 
and colleagues’ “coupled” open innovation (Enkel et al. 2009) and is closely aligned with the 
larger, prior body of work concerned with innovation collaboration and networking (e.g. 
DeBresson and Amesse 1991). 
In this, the potential benefits of collaborating for innovation are well established 
(Powell et al. 1996; Van Beers and Zand 2014). Partnering allows firms to pool resources and 
competences; it enables cost and risk sharing; it increases creativity and accelerates 
innovation; and broadens search spaces and facilitates learning (Pittaway et al. 2004). 
Certainly, the recent empirical literature is broadly consistent in demonstrating a link 
between coupled open innovation (i.e. collaboration) and innovation outputs, variously 
measured (e.g. Leiponen and Helfat 2010; Love et al. 2014; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose 2013; 
Bjerke and Johansson 2015). 
Yet, despite the apparent manifold benefits of collaborating, and the enduring belief 
that “the locus of innovation will be found in networks, not individual firms” (Powell et al. 
1996, p. 116), empirical evidence frequently records collaborative innovation as a minority 
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activity (Drechsler and Natter 2012; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2017). Simply put, coupled 
‘openness’ does not appear to be the modal form of innovating (Walsh et al. 2016). 
Notwithstanding a disproportionate focus on the benefits of collaboration, there is 
sufficient work outlining the challenges associated with collaborating to make sense of this 
empirical regularity without recourse to ‘market failure’ arguments. Moreover, many of the 
reasons why firms may choose not to collaborate are also likely to be useful in explaining 
the instability of collaborations. In the simplest terms, for instance, the failure of 
collaboration may result from resource limitations (Guzzini et al., 2018). Collaboration 
entails costs associated with searching for suitable partners, and with coordination and 
monitoring (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2016). Smaller firms, in particular, may encounter 
resource constraints as a barrier to effective collaboration (Van De Vrande et al. 2009; 
Vahter et al. 2015). 
Beyond this, and to the extent that knowledge disclosure is intrinsic to innovation 
collaboration, firms may identify legitimate concerns over partner opportunism (Bogers 
2011), the loss of intellectual property (Laursen and Salter 2013) and, more generally, 
unintended knowledge spillovers (Arora et al. 2016). These concerns are likely to be 
exacerbated by challenges associated with what Kogut (1989, p. 184) called “a fundamental 
instability in governance”. The hold-up problem associated with contracting for uncertain 
outcomes (i.e. innovation), and the related challenges of assessing qualities of solutions, is 
likely to lead to contracting on the basis of effort and resources rather than outputs. As Felin 
and Zenger (2014) note, contracts of this nature are characterised by lower-powered 




Crucially, the challenges of collaborative innovation are likely to increase with the 
number and diversity of partners. The U-shaped relationship frequently observed between 
open innovation and innovation performance (e.g. Laursen and Salter 2006; Leiponen and 
Helfat 2010; Vahter et al. 2015; Van Criekingen 2020) is thought to point to some optimal 
level of openness after which the returns to openness diminish. While the reported 
optimum number of sources of information or partner types is typically high in the empirical 
literature2 - and beyond the level practiced by ‘average’ firms – there are clear implications 
concerning the managerial and cognitive limits to effective searching and collaboration. In 
simple terms, collaborating with multiple partners increases coordination and 
communication costs and reduces the likelihood that goals and expectations will be well 
aligned (Walsh, Lee, and Nagaoka 2016). In addition, while diversity provides the spark for 
creative abrasion, increasing heterogeneity may retard integration, making it difficult to 
evaluate, select and advance ‘good’ projects (Lee et al. 2015). In short, large, complex 
collaborative arrangements are likely to associate with higher rates of innovation 
abandonment. 
The foregoing leads us to hypothesise that: 
H1A:  The proportion of abandoned projects is positively associated with collaboration 
and 
 increases with the number of partner types. 
In addition to project abandonment, we add a supplemental hypothesis on project 
completion. Temporary project interruptions or delays in project completion may represent 
                                                          
2 For instance, in their study of UK manufacturers, Laursen and Salter (2006) suggest an optimum of 11 
external knowledge sources (with a maximum of 16 and a mean of 7.22). Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2018), in 
their study of Northern Irish micro-businesses, report an optimum of around 5.2 partner types (with a 
maximum number of 7 and an observed mean of 0.594). In a study on lead-time advantage in Belgian firms 
Van Criekingen (2020), finds an optimum of 5 ‘important’ knowledge sources (with a maximum of 11 and a 
mean of 2.07). 
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a weaker form of project abandonment. To the extent that the arguments leading to 
hypothesis 1 above may all, in weaker form, also lead to project interruptions and delays, 
we also investigate successful project completion. A lower rate of project completion, in a 
given time period, also accounting for ongoing projects, may signal interruptions and delays 
in addition to abandonments.  
Accordingly, we hypothesise that 
H1B: The proportion of successfully completed projects is negatively associated with 
 collaboration  and decreases with the number of partner types. 
2.2 Partner type and innovation abandonment 
Beyond size and variety in collaborative networks, we anticipate that collaborations with 
different partner types will variously associate with innovation abandonment (Hyll and 
Pippel 2015). This is consistent with extensive prior work that points to the different roles 
played by different partners in producing different innovation outcomes (Faems, et al. 2005; 
Du et al. 2014; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose 2013; Belderbos et al. 2014). For instance, 
customers and suppliers are typically shown to be the most common innovation partners 
(Arora et al. 2016; Walsh et al. 2016) and to associate with higher incidences of product and 
process innovation, respectively (Belderbos et al. 2006; Freel and Harrison 2006). 
Cooperative projects involving Public Research Organisations (PROs) and the private 
knowledge infrastructure are less frequent, but may support the development of more 
novel innovations (Tether and Tajar 2008; Robin and Schubert 2013); while cooperation 
activities involving competitors, perhaps unsurprisingly, display more mixed results (Wu 
2014). Different collaborative research interactions may also require different absorptive 
capacities, to the extent that the knowledge content of different types of partnership differs 
(Schmidt 2010). For instance, collaboration with supply chain partners may require less 
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internal technical expertise than connections to universities or external laboratories 
(Tomlinson and Fai 2013). 
This is consistent with the common distinction drawn in the empirical literature 
between market and non-market collaborative partners (Weber and Heidenreich 2018). The 
former are likely to be sources of key technologies or market insights. Vertical 
collaborations, for instance, will frequently be concerned with exploitation (Faems et al. 
2005) and may be particularly suited for transmitting information that is specific to the 
routines of the customer or supplier and that it critical to integration (Walsh et al. 2016). 
Accordingly, vertical collaboration is particularly likely to result in successful 
commercialisation. While there is some evidence that firms that intensively draw on 
external information within the value chain are more likely to report both innovating and 
abandoning innovation (D’Este et al. 2015), collaborating with suppliers, in particular, has 
been shown to associate with a reduced risk of ‘cooperation failure’ (Lhuillery and Pfister 
2009). Suppliers and customers are likely to hold complementary, non-redundant 
knowledge, which provides the basis for a “good and open relationship” (Bogers 2011, p. 
105). 
In contrast, although cooperation with competitors provides the opportunity to 
share costs and risks, overlapping knowledge bases and competing organisational goals 
create strong incentives for opportunism (Hyll and Pippel 2015). Since competitors remain 
market rivals, they are likely to be reluctant knowledge sharers and to seek to appropriate a 
greater share of the value created (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2013). As a result, 
cooperative innovation with competitors is more likely to break down. Indeed, Lhuillery and 
Pfister (2009, p. 51) observe that “firms collaborating with competitors are most likely to 
encounter cooperation failures”. 
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With respect to collaborations involving non-market partners (i.e. universities and 
public research organisations, or consultants, designers or private R&D laboratories), 
anecdotes surrounding cooperation challenges are pervasive. Often these begin with 
observations on divergent goals. For instance, Lhuillery and Pfister (2009, p. 47) note that 
“managers often complain that universities operate on extended time lines and have little 
regard to the urgent deadline of business”3. More generally, it is suggested that universities’ 
commitment to ‘open science’ will result in weaker appropriation opportunities for 
partnering firms (Perkmann and Walsh 2007). Research activities undertaken by PROs 
(including universities) have not traditionally focused on the needs of firms, resulting in a 
‘ridge’ between the basic and applied research foci of PROs and private firms (Drejer and 
Jørgensen 2005). And, regardless of the complementarity of research interests, divergent 
incentives are likely to challenge effective collaboration (Freel et al. 2019). In short, we 
would anticipate that firms collaborating with universities will report higher rates of 
innovation abandonment. This would be consistent with Lhuillery and Pfister's (2009) 
observation that, after competitors, PROs had the highest risk of “cooperation failure”. 
In the case of partners drawn from the private knowledge infrastructure (in the 
survey this is restricted to “consultants”), the evidence from which to hypothesise is limited. 
However, here, the challenges are likely to flow from partner selection in busy markets 
characterised by extensive information asymmetries (Tether and Tajar 2008). Beyond this, 
the challenges in contracting for innovation outcomes, discussed earlier (Felin and Zenger 
2014), are also likely to loom large. 
                                                          
3 They are reporting on an observation made by Pavitt (2003), rather than one they make directly. 
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It is tempting to cast our expectations on the varying rates of abandonment by 
partner type in terms of relative cognitive proximity. As Nooteboom (1999, p. 795) argues, 
to innovate a firm “needs complementary, outside sources of cognition: cognition by others 
which is relevant but also different”. A cognition that is too proximate leads to redundancies 
and limited novelty. A cognition that is too distant retards shared understanding. However, 
while issues of shared cognition illuminate the scope for learning from collaboration, they 
say little about governance. Our intuition is that abandonment and delays in collaboration 
are likely to reflect both issues of complementary competence and adequate governance. 
To that end, our expectations on the varying failure rates of cooperative innovations 
by partner type may be better framed in terms of the varying role of trust in collaborative 
relationships. Successful delegation (or, in the current case, collaboration) “…requires trust 
in a dual sense: the other party (to whom judgement is delegated) has no interest in giving 
wrong advice (disinterestedness), and is capable of giving good advice (competence)” 
(Nooteboom 1994, p. 342). Universities are likely to be highly disinterested, but have 
variable competence (where competence extends, for instance, to assessments on speed 
and application); competitors are likely to be highly competent, but rank very low on 
disinterestedness; while, supply chain partners are likely to exhibit both high competence 
and high disinterestedness, at least to the extent that goals are well aligned. Again, with 
respect to consultants, our intuition is that the greatest challenge will be in the a priori 
assessment of competence and disinterestedness. 
Taken together, the foregoing leads us to hypothesise that: 
H2a:  Innovation collaborations with customers and suppliers (vertical collaboration) are  




H2b: Innovation collaborations with competitors (horizontal collaboration), consultants 
and  
 PROs are likely to associate with a higher rate of abandonment. 
As with hypothesis 1, we also set-up supplemental hypotheses that account for delays and 
project interruptions by analysing the proportion of successfully completed projects. Again, 
the logic underpinning these is that delays represent a weaker form of abandonment and 
are driven by the same factors. 
H2c:  Innovation collaborations with customers and suppliers (vertical collaboration) are 
  likely to associate with a higher rate of successful project completion.  
 
H2d: Innovation collaborations with competitors (horizontal collaboration), consultants 
and 
  PROs are likely to associate with a lower rate of successful project completion. 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used to conduct the analysis originates from the Flemish component of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which is an inquiry into innovative activity in the 
Belgian economy. The CIS is harmonized across European Member States with regards to 
core question. However, each country-specific edition (partly) has unique questions that are 
not available at the European scale. The data at hand consists of two cross-sections from 
2015 and 2013, i.e. the data collected in the survey refer to the time periods 2010-2012 and 
2012-2014. These two cross-sections included specific questions on the management of 
firms’ innovation projects that can be used for investigating our research questions. We also 
merge some information on firms’ annual accounts from the Orbis database to the sample; 
specifically, firms’ debt ratios and working capital. These variables will be used as further 
controls in the regression analyses. 
The survey sample is a stratified, random sample of the Flemish economy (the 
northern part of Belgium). As firms are asked in great detail about their innovation activity, 
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we can differentiate between firms that innovated, or at least attempted to innovate, and 
those that did not engage in any innovation projects. The latter are set aside in the present 
analyses, since we are interested in comparing firms that implement an open innovation 
strategy with other innovators. After deleting observations with missing values of interest, 
our final sample amounts to 999 observations on firms that at least attempted to innovate, 
i.e. they could have successfully brought at least one new product to the market, 
implemented a new production process, or have ongoing innovation activity or have at least 
had one project that has been abandoned before completion. 
Unfortunately, we will not be able to use the data as a panel in econometric terms, i.e. 
we cannot control for firm-specific effects. The sample consists of 999 observations which 
are based on 879 different firms. We only observe 60 firms in both years. Accordingly, we 
are constrained to use the data as pooled cross-sections and cannot apply panel 
econometric techniques.  
3.1 Dependent variable: shares of abandonment and completion 
The surveyed companies were requested to report the number of innovation projects that 
were (i) finished, (ii) abandoned or (iii) ongoing during the reference periods of the survey. 
One slight drawback of this variable is that the survey instrument does not unambiguously 
specify how the term “project” is defined or how it should be interpreted. This results in a 
somewhat fuzzy measurement. The median number of projects is 10 and the average is 
about 23. The first quartile of firms reports that they have up to four projects, whereas the 
number of projects in the fourth quartile is 25 and above; reaching up to almost 200 
projects. Moreover, when looking at the number of projects per R&D employee it becomes 
clear that firms have (not surprisingly) no common, comparable definition of projects in 
mind when responding to the survey. For instance, in the first quartile of firms the number 
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of projects per R&D employee is at maximum 1. This suggests that multiple persons work 
jointly on a long-term project. However, in the fourth quartile of the distribution this 
number is between 9 and more than 30 projects per person, which suggests that one person 
works on many projects during the survey reference period. This makes clear that one 
should not use the number of projects as nominal value without some normalization of 
reference point. 
Given this fuzziness of the “project” definition, we construct two relative outcome 
variables. The first is the share of projects that were abandoned during the reference period 
of the survey. We believe that this scaling of the dependent variable makes the numbers 
comparable across firms, as it is compelling that the survey respondent has answered the 
three questions on project numbers with the same project definition in mind. On average 
among all firms, the share of abandoned projects amounts to 0.11.  
In the subsequent econometric exercise, we also consider the share of completed 
projects in order to compare these numbers to abandonment. As the third type of projects 
are ongoing ones, it is not trivial that the rate of abandonment is simply the opposite of 
completion. Openness could lead to both accelerated or delayed completion. The average 
share of completed projects equals 0.55 in the sample.  
3.2 Covariates of main interest: number and type of collaborations for innovation 
projects 
The openness of the firms’ innovation strategy is measured through collaboration patterns 
in this study. A first indicator of openness could simply be a dummy variable indicating 
whether firms collaborate within the innovation projects. In the subsequent econometric 
study, however, we quantity the degree of openness to a greater extent. Following prior 
14 
 
work (e.g. Laursen and Salter 2006; Leiponen and Helfat 2010; Love et al. 2013), we create a 
variable OPEN which is a ‘collaboration count’ describing the number of different partner 
types a company had in its collaborations. The survey inquired about seven potential types: 
suppliers, private clients, government clients, competitors, consultants, universities and 
other research organisations. And, therefore, the variable OPEN ranges from 0 to 7. The 
innovators in our sample had on average 2.1 types of collaboration partners. This number 
increases to about 3.2 when we condition on openness, i.e. for the subsample with 
D(OPEN>0) = 1.  
 In the second step of the analysis, we group the collaboration types into meaningful 
subgroups in order to investigate the heterogeneous effects on project success of varying 
open innovation strategies and to test our hypotheses. These groups reflect common 
distinctions in the literature between horizontal and vertical collaboration (Tomlinson 2010) 
and between market and non-market collaboration (Tether and Tajar 2008; Bruneel et al. 
2010). Accordingly, we construct four dummy variables for collaborations with respectively:  
i. clients and suppliers (VERTICAL):  
as outlined in the second section of the paper these collaborations are the typically 
the most common ones and this also holds in our data. 59% of firms report such 
collaborations within their innovation projects. These projects are most likely among 
the routine innovation tasks and we do not expect them to fail often or be 
significantly delayed, as they focus on exploitation rather than exploration 
capabilities.  
ii. competitors (HORIZONTAL): 
also as outlined above, openness towards firms in the same industry might be more 
delicate. While potentially highly useful and not subject to antitrust according to the 
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European block exemption for R&D and innovation as pre-competitive activities, 
they might touch upon sensitive tacit knowledge and projects may therefore be 
disrupted. These collaborations are also least frequent at about 16%.  
iii. consultants (CONSULT): 
in line with the literature, we expect high degrees of information asymmetries in 
collaborations with partners from the private knowledge infrastructure and also 
manifold selection problems in partner choice. However, roughly every third firm in 
the sample engages in such collaborations. 
iv. university and other public research organisations (SCIENCE): 
last but not least, we expect that collaborations with public science organizations are 
subject to the highest asymmetries in incentives and at the same time entail the 
largest promise on future breakthrough innovations and market novelties which 
typically coincide with a high level of technological (and market) uncertainties. We 
thus expect that such collaborations are associated with higher project 
abandonment and delays, i.e. lower shares of project completions. Given the 
prospect of high returns (but with high variance), such collaborations are not 
uncommon. Almost 42% of the (innovation active) firms in the sample report such 
collaborations.  
3.3 Descriptive analysis of project abandonment, completion and openness 
In this subsection, we briefly report descriptive results on our hypotheses. We anticipated 
that the more open a firm implements its innovation strategy, the more are the projects 
prone to abandonment or delays. We show this by correlating the share of abandoned 
projects with collaboration counts. In order to get an idea about delays, we use the share of 
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completed projects in the survey period and expect a negative relationship between 
openness and completion.  
The collaboration count as a measure for openness of the innovation process is 
distributed as follows (see Table 1). About a third of all firms follow a closed innovation 
regime, i.e. they do not collaborate at all within their projects. Another quarter of 
innovators had either one or two collaboration partner types, and the remaining 40% of 
firms have three or more collaboration partner types.  
Table 1: Distribution of collaboration partner types 
OPEN #obs Rel. Freq. Cum freq. 
0 341 34.13 34.13 
1 134 13.41 47.55 
2 137 13.71 61.26 
3 112 11.21 72.47 
4 111 11.11 83.58 
5 79 7.91 91.49 
6 57 5.71 97.20 
7 28 2.80 100.00 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the openness of the innovation strategy, as 
measured by the collaboration count, and the shares of completed and abandoned projects. 
As hypothesized the rate of project abandonment increases with the degree of openness. 
Firms reporting to have zero or one collaboration partner show a rate of project 
abandonment below 10%. As the collaboration variable increases, however, this share goes 
up to about 14% for higher levels of collaboration (4 to 6 partners). Note that this is a sizable 
marginal effect of a 40%-increase (4 percentage points) with more intense collaboration. 
The rate of abandonment reaches its maximum of about 18% for those companies with the 
most open innovation regime (all 7 partner types). 
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Figure 1: Shares of abandoned and completed projects by level of openness 
 
As hypothesized, we find a negative relationship between the successfully 
completed projects and the openness of the innovation strategy. Firms with a closed 
innovation regime (collaboration count equals zero) complete about 60% of their projects in 
the survey period. As openness increases, however, this share reduces to around 50% when 
four or five collaborator types are involved and lowers further to about 44% with six or 
more partners. Note that this is, again, a sizable marginal change of roughly a 27%-decrease 
(16 percentage points) in successful project completion over the range of openness. 
3.4 Control variables 
In the subsequent econometric study, we control for a number of other covariates that 
might affect project abandonment and successful completion independent of the openness 
of the innovation strategy.  
 The first set of controls is related to the innovation projects themselves. We can 
derive a measure of average project size by dividing total innovation expenditure at the firm 
level by the number of innovation projects the firm conducts. The variable AVG PROJ SIZE 
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might affect the likelihood to abandon projects and to complete them. A firm with relatively 
small projects might naturally have a higher flow than a firm with relatively large projects. 
We also include the squared value of AVG PROJ SIZE in order to allow for non-linearity. In 
addition, we attempt to control for the ‘ambition’ of the innovation projects. Here, we use 
the sales of products new to the firms’ market which stem from their recent innovation 
projects. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) argued that firms scoring high on such a variable 
are performing more cutting-edge research rather than routine tasks, which in turn may of 
course also coincide with the chance of higher project abandonment rates and less 
successful project completion. We use this variable scaled by total sales in order avoid 
collinearity with firm size (NOVELTY). 
 A prominent topic in the innovation literature is the debate about financial 
constraints resulting from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (see e.g. 
Hall and Lerner, 2010, for a survey). Both internal and external access to capital might 
directly affect project management (see Andries and Hünermund, 2020), and thus 
abandonment and completion. We have therefore collected the companies’ debt ratio and 
working capital. DEBT is measured as debt divided by total capital and WCAP is measured as 
working capital per employee. It is a-priori ambiguous what sign one should expect for their 
estimated coefficients. One the one hand, a high debt ratio might lead to project 
abandonment as the firm cannot borrow more money. On the other, a high debt ratio might 
simply indicate good access to capital. A low working capital per employee could lead to 
more project abandonment due to cash flow restrictions. These could, however, be 
compensated by external capital. Given the literature, it is certainly desirable to control for 
the firms’ financial situation. However, we do not have clear priors on the expected signs of 
the coefficients in our specific context.  
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Related to the financial situation, according to the balance sheet, is whether the 
firms have received public subsidies for R&D projects (see Zunica et al. 2014, for a survey on 
R&D subsidies; and Hünermund and Czarnitzki, 2019, for a recent contribution). We include 
a dummy variable, SUBSIDY, in the regression indicating whether the firm has at least one 
subsidized project in the survey reference periods. Receiving a subsidy implies that the firms 
do not only use their private financial resources for the project but that a non-negligible 
share of the cost is publicly financed. Accordingly, we anticipate that firms that are subsidy-
backed are less likely to abandon a project in a certain time period. The effect on project 
completion is expected to be negative, as subsidized projects might be the more challenging 
ones in the portfolio. Projects clearly below any technological frontier might never be 
awarded subsidies in the first place. 
We also include a patent dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has 
applied for at least one patent in the past. We collected this information from the PATSTAT 
database for each firm. Active use of intellectual property rights may avoid IP disputes 
during the project implementation and may therefore lead to less abandonment or delays. 
Finally, we include common firm level controls that might affect project 
management. We use firm size measured as employment. Because of the skewness of 
employment, we use log(EMP) in the regressions. Similarly, firm age might affect innovation 
project management (see e.g. García-Quevedo, et al. 2014; Coad et al. 2016). The age also 
enters the regression in logarithmic form, log(AGE). We also include a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm is a member of a firm consortium, GROUP, which might also affect 
the management of innovation projects.  
Finally, we control for unobserved sectoral differences by including a set of nine 
industry dummies (see Table 8 in the appendix) and a time dummy for 2015, which controls 
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for other non-observed macro-economic changes that might have affected project 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
        Note: 9 industry dummies not presented. 
 
  
All innovators  
N=999 
Non cooperating innovators  
N = 341 
Cooperation active 
innovators  
N = 658 
Variable  Unit Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Abandoned projects share 0.11 0.16 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.12 0 1 
Finished projects share 0.55 0.28 0 1 0.61 0 1 0.52 0 1 
Openness variables 
OPEN (Collaboration count) count 2.12 2.09 0 7 0 0 0 3.22 1 7 
VERTICAL dummy 0.59 0.49 0 1 0 0 0 0.90 0 1 
HORIZONTAL dummy 0.16 0.36 0 1 0 0 0 0.24 0 1 
CONSULT dummy 0.32 0.47 0 1 0 0 0 0.49 0 1 
SCIENCE dummy 0.42 0.49 0 1 0 0 0 0.63 0 1 
Controls variables 
AVG PROJ SIZE (R&D expenses/projects)  Mill. € 0.09 0.15 0 0.90 0.06 0 0.90 0.11 0 0.83 
NOVELTY (share of new products in total 
sales) 
share 0.07 0.16 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.08 0 1 
PATENT  dummy 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.32 0 1 
DEBT (debt / total assets)  share 0.60 0.19 0.04 1 0.61 0.04 1 0.59 0.05 1 
WCAP/EMP ( = Working Capital per 
employee)  
Mill. € 0.07 0.13 -0.07 1.82 0.06 -0.06 0.9 0.08 -0.07 1.82 
SUBSIDY dummy 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.28 0 1 0.58 0 1 
EMP (Employment) count 119 217 1 2718 79 1 1055 139 1 2718 
AGE count 28 18 1 143 27 2 143 29 1 127 
GROUP (membership dummy) dummy 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.55 0 1 0.69 0 1 
Year 2015 dummy dummy 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.52 0 1 0.56 0 1 
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4 Econometric study 
In the subsequent econometric study, we estimate fractional response models (cf. Papke 
and Wooldridge, 1996) as our dependent variables are fractions ranging between 0 and 1. It 
is often seen as more compelling to fit fractional response models that account for the 
boundedness of the dependent variable than simply using linear regressions. In our case, we 
use the Probit link function to account for the bounds at 0 and 1. We thus specify  





where y is our dependent variable, x is the vector of covariates, and  denotes the standard 
normal CDF,  are the slope coefficients and  the standard error to be estimated. In order 
to interpret the economic magnitude, the marginal effects for some continuous xk are 












In case of dummy variables, we calculate the marginal effects as difference in expected 
values for a discrete change from 0 to 1. As the marginal effects will vary among the 
observations i, we will show the average marginal effects in the result section. In all 
estimated models, we employ clustered standard errors at the firm level. It is noteworthy 
that all results reported below also hold when linear OLS regressions are employed.  
4.1 Abandonment, delays, and openness 
In Table 3, we show the average marginal effects for a unit change in x. Initially we only 
include the collaboration count as measure for openness and controls for the sector and the 
survey year. Next, we add the full set of firm level controls into the specification. Regarding 
project abandonment, we find that the collaboration count is associated with higher 
23 
 
abandonment rates. Each extension of the openness by one collaboration channel increases 
the share of abandoned projects by 0.8%-points. As the mean of firms that do not follow an 
open innovation strategy is about 10%, it is quite a sizable impact: 8% per collaboration 
count, on average.  
 Interestingly, most covariates have no systematic relationship with abandonment. 
The only variables that show a statistically significant effect are the subsidy dummy and firm 
size. The subsidy dummy has a large negative effect, i.e. firms that receive public funds for 
their innovation projects are less likely to abandon projects. This is consistent with financial 
management implications (cf. Andries and Hünermund, 2020); the more restrictive project 
funds are, the more careful firms manage their project portfolio. The financial argument 
seems to outweigh the hypothesis that publicly financed projects are more challenging and 
would therefore be more often abandoned. Of course, it may also signal a selection effect, 
with ‘better’ firms receiving funds for ‘better’ projects. Eventually, larger firms also tend to 
have a higher abandonment rate (though only weakly statistically significant at 10%). This 
may indicate the availability of more and more specialised resources to support, for 
instance, more professional (financial) project management.  
 In the regressions on project completion, which indicate project delays or 
interruptions in addition to abandonment, we also find a statistically significant and 
economically sizeable effect of openness. Here the marginal effect amounts to 1.8%-points 
for each expansion of the openness regime. As the average completion rate is about 59%, 
firms face a 3% lower completion rate for each extra collaboration channel.  
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Table 3: Marginal effects in fractional response models on project abandonment and completion  
Project abandonment Project completion 








OPEN 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.023*** -0.018***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
AVG PROJ SIZE4  0.017  -0.443*** 
  (0.077)  (0.120) 
NOVELTY   0.026  0.045 
  (0.029)  (0.055) 
PATENT  0.015  -0.031 
  (0.012)  (0.020) 
WCAP/EMP  -0.045  0.067 
  (0.040)  (0.068) 
DEBT  0.017  -0.028 
  (0.024)  (0.049) 
SUBSIDY  -0.029**  -0.002 
  (0.012)  (0.021) 
log(EMP)  0.009*  -0.014 
  (0.005)  (0.009) 
log(AGE)  -0.007  -0.012 
  (0.008)  (0.013) 
GROUP  -0.006  -0.008 
  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Y2015 -0.011 -0.009 0.004 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Sector dummies χ2(8)  









Log Pseudo-likelihood -349.76 -348.09 -680.42 -675.37 
Notes: N= 999; Significance levels: *** 1% or less; ** less than 5% , * less than 10%;   
 All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Except the R&D project size, none of the other controls is statistically significant in 
the regression. The marginal effect of the average project size is -0.44 for a unit change. 
However, a unit change is not a meaningful number in this case. The median project size is 
0.06, i.e. € 60,000 per project. If the project size would double to € 120,000, the implied 
change in completion rate would amount to - 2.7%. This average negative effect suggests 
that the larger projects are more ambitious and are therefore more often delayed or 
interrupted than smaller ones.  
                                                          
4 The regression includes AVG PROJ SIZE and also (AVG PROJ SIZE)2. When calculating marginal effects, we of 
course get only one effect from the two estimated coefficients that describe a non-linear curve. It turns out 
that the estimated effect is not inverse U-shaped or U-shaped. Instead, in the data range it is just a non-linear, 
downward sloping curve in the regression on project completion. There are no statistically significant results in 
the regression on abandonment. 
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In order to present the marginal effects in the corresponding way to the 
unconditional descriptive statistics as shown in Figure 1, we calculated the expected project 
abandonment and completion rates at the different levels of openness in Table 4 In a closed 
innovation regime, the average firm would abandon about 10% (9.8%) of its projects and 
complete about 59% (58.9%) of them.  
Table 4: Conditional means of abandonment and completion as function of openness 
MEs Project abandonment Project completion 
at OPEN = 0 0.098*** 0.589*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
at OPEN = 1 0.105*** 0.571*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
at OPEN = 2 0.113*** 0.553*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
at OPEN = 3 0.120*** 0.534*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
at OPEN = 4 0.129*** 0.516*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
at OPEN = 5 0.137*** 0.498*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) 
at OPEN = 6 0.146*** 0.480*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) 
at OPEN = 7 0.156*** 0.461*** 
 (0.014) (0.022) 
 Notes: N= 999; Significance levels: *** 1% or less; ** less than 5% , * less than 10%. 
 The numbers are derived from the regressions including the full set of covariates as shown in Table 3. 
 An increasing level of openness is associated with higher rates of abandonment and 
lower rates of completion. These rates would change to 15.6% and 46.1% at the maximum 
level of openness, i.e. abandonment rises by about 59% and completion falls by 22%. This 
shows that open innovation regimes may entail substantial costs for the firm. As most of 
innovation expenses are R&D cost for personnel, these cost are also immediately sunk and 
no corresponding value of these expenses remains in the balance sheet.  
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4.2 Abandonment, delays and type of collaboration 
In Table 5, we show the results of fractional response models on project abandonment and 
completion where we split the collaboration variable into four dummies which differentiate 
the openness by type of collaboration. We find that collaborations with consultants and 
with science are associated with project abandonment and delays.  
In the regressions on project abandonment, both consultants and science are 
associated with higher failure rates. The marginal effects amount 3.4%-points and 2.8%-
points, respectively. In the regression on project completion, we only find a statistically 
significant negative effect for partners from the public research sector. These findings are in 
line with the notion that divergent incentives of scientists in firms and public research 
institutions challenge effective collaboration (Freel, Persaud, and Chamberlin 2019). The 
complaints of managers that universities operate on extended timelines and have little 
regard to the urgent deadline of business, as mentioned by Lhuillery and Pfister (2009) also 
seem to apply to our sample. We find, not only that projects are more likely to be 
abandoned, but also that the rate of completion is lower. This can be interpreted as more 
frequent disruptions and delays in university collaborations.  
With respect to the involvement of consultants in the innovation process, we interpret 
our finding as evidence for challenges in partner selection due to information asymmetries 
(Tether and Tajar 2008). 
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Table 5: Marginal effects in fractional response models by type of collaboration 
Variables Project abandonment Project completion 








VERTICAL -0.012 -0.013 0.009 0.01  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) 
HORIZONTAL -0.012 -0.011 0.008 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.023) 
CONSULT 0.033*** 0.034*** -0.042** -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) 
SCIENCE 0.018 0.028** -0.091*** -0.082*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) 
AVG PROJ SIZE  -0.001  -0.421*** 
  (0.078)  (0.120) 
NOVELTY  0.027  0.045 
  (0.029)  (0.054) 
PATENT  0.017  -0.033 
  (0.012)  (0.020) 
WCAP/EMP  -0.05  0.068 
  (0.040)  (0.066) 
DEBT  0.011  -0.021 
  (0.024)  (0.049) 
SUBSIDY  -0.032***  0.009 
  (0.012)  (0.021) 
log(EMP)  0.009*  -0.015* 
  (0.005)  (0.009) 
log(AGE)  -0.008  -0.011 
  (0.008)  (0.013) 
GROUP  -0.005  -0.009 
  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Y2015 -0.013 -0.011 0.007 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Sector dummies χ2(8)  









Log Pseudo-likelihood -348.99 -347.12 -679.23 -674.42 
Notes: N= 999; Significance levels: *** 1% or less; ** less than 5% , * less than 10%;   
 All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
4.3 Robustness test: Seemingly unrelated least squares regressions 
In addition to fractional response models that account for the fact that the dependent 
variables are bounded between 0 and 1, we have also estimated linear regressions. As we 
have two equations, abandonment and completion, we estimated the equations jointly by 
employing a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach. This method utilizes possible 
correlations among the error terms of the equations and is thus an efficient estimator. In 
addition, one can easily test cross-equation restrictions. This is interesting because of the 
following reason: if it is true that in addition to abandonment, openness leads to significant 
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interruptions and delays, the coefficient of openness in the regression on completion should 
be, in terms of its absolute magnitude, larger than the coefficient in the abandonment 
equation.  
The regression results are displayed in Table 6. The results are remarkably similar to 
those of the fractional response models and therefore we refrain from discussing them in 
detail.  
Table 6: SUR on abandonment and completion 





OPEN 0.008*** -0.018***  
(0.003) (0.005) 
AVG PROJ SIZE 0.041 -0.633*** 
 (0.094) (0.169) 
AVG PROJ SIZE^2 -0.130 1.031*** 
 (0.142) (0.257) 
NOVELTY  0.025 0.045 
 (0.033) (0.059) 
PATENT 0.015 -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.022) 
WCAP/EMP -0.042 0.065 
 (0.038) (0.068) 
DEBT 0.017 -0.028 
 (0.025) (0.046) 
SUBSIDY -0.029*** -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
log(EMP) 0.009* -0.014 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
log(AGE) -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
GROUP -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
Y2015 -0.010 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.018) 
Sector dummies χ2(8) 





 Notes: N= 999; Significance levels: *** 1% or less; ** less than 5% , * less than 10%;   
 All regressions include a constant term. 
When testing whether the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of OPEN is larger in 
the completion regression (coef. = -0.018) than in the abandonment regression (coef. = 
0.008), we set up the hypothesis  
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H0:  0.008 = abs(-0.018). 
The test rejects the Null with χ2(1) =5.04, Prob > χ2=0.025. This reaffirms our logic that 
testing project completion in addition to abandonment carries extra information, as one 
could formulate this as: 
 “abandonment = Total projects – completion – interruption – delay”.  
Project abandonment is therefore just the most extreme form of ‘failure’, but the 
innovation process might also the impeded significantly by weaker forms of ‘failure’, such as 
delays.  
4.4 Accounting for endogeneity of openness 
Some readers might be concerned that our findings are partly driven by a simultaneous 
equation bias, e.g. both the project outcomes and openness are determined by some 
unobserved variables. In that case a classic endogeneity problem would occur. The 
unobserved variable would be correlated with openness but is hidden in the error term of 
our econometric model. This would result in the covariance between openness, i.e. a 
violation of a fundamental assumption of the aforementioned regression models. In order 
to conduct a robustness test, we run instrumental variable (IV) regressions that account for 
such endogeneity. The challenge is to find relevant and exogeneous instrumental variables. 
The IVs have to be correlated with openness, but must be exogenous to our regression 
model; or in other words they must not depend on a firm’s project outcomes. We have 
experimented with a number of instruments at the firm-level, the industry level and 
regional level. The instruments at the firm-level such as hampering factor for innovation 
projects turned out to be not exogenous (in Sargan tests). The instruments such as number 
of firms in a region or number of innovating firms in a region turned out not to be relevant, 
i.e. they were insignificant in the first stage of an IV regression.  
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Two variables at the sector level were found to be relevant and exogenous IVs, though. 
First we use the share of innovating companies at the two-digit NACE sector level. This 
variable may constitute options for collaboration for each firm, at least at the national level. 
We find that it is positively correlated with openness. Furthermore, it cannot be determined 
by the decision-making of an individual firm, and is therefore exogenous to the original 
regression model. In addition, we created an index variable that measures to what degree 
firms in an industry rely on external knowledge sources. In the first year of the survey data 
that we are using, firms were asked whether they use certain channels for seeking 
information for their innovation projects and how important these are (this is different from 
formal collaboration). Firms are asked how important are (i) market sources (suppliers, 
customers, firms in the same industry and consultants), (ii) universities and other 
institutions of higher education, and (iii) conferences, fairs, exhibitions, journals and patents 
as well as sector associations. Drawing from Laursen and Salter’s (2006) conceptualization of 
breadth and depth of search strategies, we combine these variables to a single index 
measuring knowledge spillovers, however (see Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2012, and Cappelli et al., 
2014, for similar approaches). The companies could indicate the importance of each channel 
from 0 to 3. We sum up all scores and average them at the 3-digit industry level to obtain a 
measure on how much the industry generally relies on externally available knowledge, or 
the level of knowledge spillovers in the industry. The level of spillovers could be both 
positively or negatively related to the search for collaboration partners. If knowledge is 
circulating intensely in an industry, it could imply that firms are also heavily engaging in 
collaboration as external knowledge is essential for innovation. If knowledge is freely 
available, however, it might also lead to a lower necessity of formal collaborations in such 
industries. In the regression, we find that the industry level of knowledge spillovers is 
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positively related to our openness variable. It turns out that the average spillover level is 
relevant, i.e. highly correlated with our collaboration count variable, and it should also be 
exogenous as a single firm will not determine the industry level of knowledge spillovers (this 
is also confirmed by Sargan tests).  
Our regression results are presented in Table 7. We find that both IVs are positive and 
significant in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. Furthermore, the F-statistic of the IVs in 
the first stage is higher than 10, i.e. we do not face a weak instrument problem according to 
Stock and Yogo (2005). The Hansen J statistic does not reject the validity of our instrumental 
variables. In the regression on project completion, the coefficient of openness is negative, 
- 0.07, and statistically significant at the 5% level. The previous results thus hold. IN the 
abandonment regression, the coefficient amount to 0.027, but is only weakly significant at 
the 10% level. In order to gain some efficiency, we therefore also applied the Lewbel (2012) 
IV estimation technique where one generates additional instrumental variables by exploiting 
heteroscedasticity in the first stage of the regression. The error term is multiplied with the 
centered regressors of the first stage, and these terms can be used as instruments in the 2nd 
stage. All regular IV regression diagnostics on relevance and exogeneity can be applied. It 
turned out that we three additional instruments are relevant: the cross-terms of the 
residuals with the variables SUBSIDY, log(EMP) and NOVELTY. Consequently we re-run the IV 
regressions for the abandonment equation as explained before with these three additional 
instruments. The results are shown in the right panel of the table. The magnitude of the 
OPEN coefficient drops slightly to 0.17 but is now significant at the 5% level. Therefore all 
previously reported results also hold when accounting for possible endogeneity of openness 




Table 7: IV (2SLS) regressions and Lewbel-IV regression 
 IV regression 
(First stage is identical for both 2nd stages) 
IV regression with supplemental Lewbel IVs 




















OPEN  0.027* -0.070**  0.017**  
 (0.016) (0.031)  (0.008) 
AVG PROJ SIZE 0.288 0.03 -0.571*** 0.171 0.037 
 (1.164) (0.102) (0.174) (1.036) (0.100) 
AVG PROJ SIZE^2 0.796 -0.12 0.987*** 0.808 -0.119 
 (1.836) (0.145) (0.248) (1.512) (0.140) 
NOVELTY  0.803* 0.009 0.098 0.966*** 0.019 
 (0.45) (0.033) (0.065) (0.363) (0.030) 
PATENT 0.407** 0.008 -0.003 0.320** 0.013 
 (0.159) (0.014) (0.025) (0.144) (0.012) 
WCAP/EMP 0.456 -0.051 0.096 0.463 -0.046 
 (0.356) (0.033) (0.070) (0.35) (0.031) 
DEBT -0.201 0.025 -0.043 -0.084 0.021 
 (0.315) (0.026) (0.054) (0.302) (0.025) 
SUBSIDY 1.290*** -0.055** 0.066 1.298*** -0.041** 
 (0.138) (0.025) (0.048) (0.135) (0.016) 
log(EMP) 0.199*** 0.002 -0.003 0.201*** 0.005 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.011) (0.058) (0.005) 
log(AGE) -0.157 -0.007 -0.017 -0.167* -0.009 
 (0.097) (0.008) (0.014) (0.097) (0.008) 
GROUP 0.142 -0.005 -0.007 0.165 -0.004 
 (0.141) (0.012) (0.023) (0.138) (0.011) 
Y2015 -0.196 -0.009 0.000 -0.203* -0.011 
 (0.122) (0.011) (0.020) (0.119) (0.010) 
PCT. OF INNOVATION ACTIVE FIRMS PER NACE 1.222**   1.243**  
 (0.591)   (0.542)  
INDUSTRY AVG. RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.079***   0.078***  
 (0.021)   (0.019)  
LEWBEL INSTUMENTS (joint F-statistic)    9.12***  
Sector dummies  
Hansen J statistic 

















Notes: N= 958; Significance levels: *** 1% or less; ** less than 5% , * less than 10%; all regressions include an intercept; standard errors are robust. 
The Lewbel (2012) IV regression has three extra instruments that are based on heteroscedasticity in the first stage. The variables used to construct the instruments are SUBSIDY, 
log(EMP) and NOVELTY. 
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
Our results show that the proportion of abandoned projects is positively associated with the 
openness of firms’ innovation strategy; where openness is measured by innovation-related 
cooperation. The rate of project completion, which in addition to abandonment also 
accounts for project interruptions and delays, shows a negative relationship with openness. 
Furthermore, openness towards non-market partners such as public research institutions 
and consultants seems to be most problematic in terms of successful project management. 
While both public science and consultants may have unique resources that a firm could not 
access in a closed innovation regime, at large scale these collaborations are associated with 
lower success rates. 
 Our study thus adds to the scarce literature on failures in innovation projects, 
especially in the context of open innovation (cf. Link and Wright 2015). While innovation 
activity is surely characterized by high uncertainty and collaborations may help to bundle 
competences and share risks, the results of this study also highlight the downside of 
openness as measured by collaboration. Openness entails transaction cost, including 
coordination and monitoring cost, and is associated with problems of asymmetric 
information. Given the negative results on project success, our study is thus in line with the 
literature highlighting failures in strategic alliances (Hagedoorn et al. 2000; D’Este et al. 
2015).  
 As the literature points out (Chesbrough 2010; Leoncini 2016) that innovation failure, 
including failures resulting from collaborative innovation, need not be negative. Failure and 
learning are linked in innovation processes, given the role of trial-and-error discovery. 
However, when failures, interruptions and delays constitute a larger component of 
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innovation projects, the negative impact on firm performance may outweigh any positive 
learning effects.  
 Both managers and policy makers may find these results useful. First, managers may 
want to pay more attention to collaborative projects and install rigorous project 
management, monitoring and evaluation because of the possible negative effects of 
openness. In short, firms must be cautious collaborators; assessing benefits and costs and 
selecting partners with care, and ensuring adequate resources are set aside for project 
management. Policy makers may want to critically review their subsidy schemes for R&D 
and innovation. In most industrialized countries, pre-competitive collaboration is welcomed 
for the reason of bundling competences; in particular, collaboration with public science has 
become a desired pattern in subsidy schemes, since technology transfer activities from 
public science to industry have been subject of numerous policy initiatives. Given the higher 
rate of failure and lower rates of project completion, policy makers may want to re-think the 
requirement of openness in subsidy schemes.  
 While our study utilizes quite unique data on innovation project management, the 
study is of course not without limitations. Our data is rich on quantitative information on 
project outcomes. However, we lack detailed information on the importance of any given 
project for the firm. If only peripheral project fail or are delayed, it may not threaten the 
long-run competitiveness of the focal firm. It would thus be desirable to be able to weight 
the projects with respect to their importance to the firms’ core business. In addition, there 
might be further detrimental effects of openness that are beyond the scope of project 
abandonment, interruptions and delays. Openness in the innovation process may lead to 
involuntary knowledge leakage that may harm the current competitive position due to 
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imitation, and also to unintended staff mobility that may threaten the firm’s knowledge 
base embedded in its human capital.  
 Furthermore, it would be desirable to conduct a similar study with a larger and longer 
panel of firms in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity. While we have a rich set of 
covariates, it may still be the case that some remaining time-constant heterogeneity across 
firms exists.  
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Table 8: Industry composition of the sample 











Food, beverage, tobacco 129 12.91 2.22 0.14 0.57 
Textile, clothing and leather industry 46 4.6 2.60 0.17 0.51 
Manufacture of cokes, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
rubber and plastic 
141 14.11 2.91 0.16 0.48 
Manufacture of non-ferro minerals, metals and 
metal products (no machinery and equipment) 
90 9.01 2.04 0.13 0.59 
Manufacture of electrical equipment, IT-products, 
electronic and optical products 
62 6.21 2.18 0.10 0.57 
Manufacture of machinery, equipment, tools and 
transport 
84 8.41 1.95 0.09 0.58 
Wholesale 103 10.31 1.63 0.10 0.60 
Telecommunication, software design and 
programming, computer-consultancy, information 
services, architects and engineering, R&D 
185 18.52 1.85 0.09 0.54 
Remaining sectors not classified above 159 15.92 1.94 0.08 0.57 
Total 999 100.00    
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